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sUPreme coUrt WAtch
recent decisions of selected criminAl cAses | by glenn godfrey
Berghuis v. smith
No. 08-1402
Decided: March 30, 2010
Question Presented:
What is the appropriate test to measure underrepresentation 
in a jury?
Facts:
In 1993, Diapolis Smith was tried for murder in Kent 
County, Michigan. Kent County’s juror assignment order, 
which was in effect when Smith’s jury was empaneled, as-
signed prospective jurors first to local district courts, and, only 
after filling local needs, made the remaining persons available 
to the countywide circuit court. The circuit court heard felony 
cases, like Smith’s. A large majority of the African-American 
residents of Kent County live in Grand Rapids, home to a single 
local court.
Voir dire for Smith’s trial took place in September 1993. 
The venire panel included between 60 and 100 individuals. At 
most three members of the venire panel were African-Ameri-
can. Smith unsuccessfully objected to the composition of the 
venire panel. Smith’s case proceeded to trial before an all-white 
jury. Smith was eventually convicted.
The month after voir dire for Smith’s trial, Kent County 
reversed the assignment order. It did so, according to the Circuit 
Court Administrator, based on “[t]he belief . . . that the respec-
tive districts essentially swallowed up most of the minority ju-
rors,” leaving the Circuit Court with a jury pool that “did not 
represent the entire county.”
Smith appealed his conviction on the ground that he had 
been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from 
a fair cross-section of the community. After the Michigan Su-
preme Court rejected Smith’s arguments, he sought federal ha-
beas relief, which the Sixth Circuit granted.
Decision:
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the 
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding 
against the Smith. The Court held that Smith had failed to estab-
lish that the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court “involved 
an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”–the 
standard of review for habeas petitions.
Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the com-
munity. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). The 
Court held that a criminal defendant must establish three things 
to demonstrate a prima facie violation of this right: that (1) a 
“distinctive” group (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented 
in jury pools because of (3) “systematic exclusion” from the 
jury selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Smith argued Kent County’s juror assignment system si-
phoned minority jurors away from the countywide circuit court. 
The resulting being that African Americans were systematically 
excluded from the circuit court jurors.
The state and lower federal courts focused on the second 
element of the Duren test, by considering the question of how 
underrepresentation in the jury is appropriately measured. The 
courts below and the parties noted federal courts had applied 
three different methods to measure fair and reasonable repre-
sentation: the absolute and comparative disparity tests, and the 
standard deviation test. However, rather than endorse any one 
test the Court merely observed that neither Duren nor any other 
decision of the Court specifies the method or test courts must 
use to measure the representation of distinctive groups in jury 
pools. In any case, the Court found that all available tests for 
measuring underrepresentation were “imperfect.”
Instead, the Court rested its decision on the “systematic 
exclusion” element of the Duren test. To establish systematic 
exclusion, Smith contended he only needed to show the under-
representation was persistent and “produced by the method or 
‘system’ used to select [jurors],” rather than by chance. The 
Court rejected Smith’s argument that “siphoning” and other 
factors constituted a “systematic” cause of underrepresentation 
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of African-Americans in Kent County’s jury pool. Rather, the 
Court found that “no clearly established precedent of this Court 
supports Smith’s claim that he can make out a prima facie case 
merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in 
combination, might contribute to a group’s underrepresenta-
tion.” Justice Ginsburg indicated that “Smith’s best evidence of 
systematic exclusion was . . . a decline in comparative under-
representation, from 18 to 15.1%, after Kent County reversed 
the assignment order.” The Court also found that, although the 
record established that some officials and others in Kent County 
believed that the assignment order created racial disparities, 
Smith’s evidence did not substantiate that the the County re-
versed the order in response to racial disparities.
BLoate v. united states
No. 08-728 
Decided: March 8, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether time granted to prepare pretrial motions is auto-
matically excluded from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day time 
limit, within which a criminal defendant’s trial must commence?
Facts:
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. §3161, requires 
that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days after 
the defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance, which-
ever is later. If this deadline is not met, the defendant is entitled 
to a dismissal of the charges. The Act, however, excludes from 
the 70-day period time lost to certain types of delay.
Petitioner Bloate was indicted on August 24, 2006. After 
his arraignment, the Magistrate Judge ordered the parties to file 
pretrial motions by September 13. On September 7, the court 
granted Bloate’s motion to extend that deadline to September 
25. On the new due date, Bloate waived his right to file pretrial 
motions. On October 4, the Magistrate found the waiver was 
voluntary and intelligent.
Over the next three months, the petitioner’s trial was de-
layed for several reasons. On February 19, 2007—179 days 
after he was indicted—Bloate moved to dismiss the indictment, 
claiming that the Act’s 70-day limit had elapsed. The district 
court denied the motion, excluding the time from September 7 
through October 4 as pretrial motion preparation time.
Decision:
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court held 
the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically 
excludable from the 70-day limit under the Speedy Trial Act. 
Such time may be excluded only when a district court finds, on 
the record, that granting the extra time serves the ends of justice.
Subsection (h)(1)(D) renders automatically excludable 
“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of 
the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other 
prompt disposition of, such motion.” The Court read this to 
mean that the provision communicates Congress’ judgment 
that delay resulting from pretrial motions is automatically ex-
cludable. In other words, delay from pretrial motion preparation 
is excludable without district court findings, but only from the 
time a motion is filed through the hearing or disposition point. 
Any other delay due to pretrial motions is excludable when ac-
companied by district court findings.
As a result, the Court held that the 28-day period from Sep-
tember 7 through October 4, which included the additional time 
granted by the district court for pretrial motion preparation, is 
not automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1). Because 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address whether any 
portion of that time might have been otherwise excludable, the 
Court did not consider whether any other exclusion would apply 
to all or part of the 28-day period.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion expressing 
that the majority opinion should not be read to bar the Eighth 
Circuit “from considering, on remand, the Government’s argu-
ment that the indictment, and conviction under it, remain ef-
fective.”
The dissent by Justice Alito, joined by Breyer, disagreed 
with the Majority’s interpretation of the text. Alito reasoned that 
Subsection (h)(1)(D) was not exhaustive and, therefore, the time 
following pretrial motion deadline could have been excludable.
FLorida v. poweLL
130 S. Ct. 1195
Decided: February 23, 2010
Question Presented:
Must a suspect be expressly advised of his right to counsel 
present during questioning?
Facts:
Powell, respondent, was arrested by Tampa Police. Before 
questioning him, an officer read him their standard Miranda 
form, stating, inter alia: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
before answering any of our questions” and “[y]ou have the 
right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this 
interview.” Powell then made some inculpatory statements.
At his trial, Powell moved to suppress the inculpatory state-
ments based on the contention that the Miranda warnings he 
received did not adequately convey that he had a right to the 
presence of an attorney during questioning, not just before ques-
tioning. The motion was denied, and Powell was convicted.
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Decision:
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which six other justices joined which held that the warnings 
Powell received were constitutionally satisfactory. Miranda v. 
Arizona requires that a suspect “must be clearly informed that 
he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer 
with him during interrogation.” 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). The 
majority noted that, while the warnings prescribed by Miranda 
are invariable, this Court has not dictated the words in which 
the essential information must be conveyed. In determining 
whether police warnings were satisfactory, the inquiry is sim-
ply whether the warnings reasonably “conveyed to [a suspect] 
his rights as required by Miranda.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 
U.S. 195, 203 (1989).
The Court found the warning communicated to Powell that 
he (1) could consult with a lawyer before answering any par-
ticular question and (2) he could exercise that right while the 
interrogation was underway. In combination, the two warnings 
reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an attorney present, 
not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented, con-
cluding that the warnings were inadequate. Justice Stevens ar-
gued the warning failed entirely to inform Powell of his right 
to an attorney’s presence during the interrogation. Instead, the 
warnings suggested that he could only consult with a lawyer 
before questioning began.
graham v. FLorida And suLLivan v. FLorida
Graham: No. 08–7412
Sullivan: No. 08-7621
Decided: May 17, 2010
Question Presented:
Does the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibit the sentence of life without the possibility 
of parole imposed on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide 
offense?
Facts:
Terrance Graham was convicted of armed burglary and 
attempted armed robbery at the age of 16. After serving a 12-
month sentence, Graham was accused of a probation violation 
for his involvement in an armed burglary. At the probation vio-
lation hearing, the judge considered Graham’s violent history 
and sentenced him to life in prison without parole.
At the age of thirteen, Joseph Sullivan was convicted of 
burglary and raping an elderly woman. At sentencing, the state 
presented evidence that Sullivan had participated in at least sev-
enteen crimes before the rape and burglary. The judge deter-
mined that, given Sullivan’s violent past, he should be treated 
as an adult offender and sentenced Sullivan to life in prison 
without the chance of parole.
Decision:
Graham
In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a juvenile of-
fender convicted of a non-homicide offense to be sentenced to 
life in prison without the chance of parole. The Court further 
held that the state need not “guarantee the offender eventual 
release,” only that the offender must have some “realistic op-
portunity to obtain release by the end of that term.”
The Court found that a life sentence without the chance of 
parole upon a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide 
served no accepted penological purpose. The Court determined 
that “the limited culpability of juvenile non-homicide offenders; 
and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the 
conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is 
cruel and unusual.”
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, to which Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. The concurrence primar-
ily took exception with Justice Thomas’ dissenting argument 
that the majority opinion is not consistent with prior opinions. 
Stevens argued that society’s view of what is “cruel and un-
usual” evolves as society accumulates knowledge, learns from 
mistakes, and gains experience.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence, argu-
ing that, while he agreed that Graham’s particular sentence was 
unconstitutional considering his juvenile status and the nature of 
his crimes, he did not agree that the Court should create a new 
categorical rule.
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, to which Justices 
Scalia and Alito joined, arguing that the majority imposed its own 
moral judgment over the overwhelming legislative majority to im-
plement a categorical rule that was not intended by the founders.
Sullivan
The Court dismissed Sullivan as “improvidently granted.”
Johnson v. united states
No. 08-6925
Decided: March 2, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether Florida’s felony battery statute, which only re-
quires the “actual and intentional touching” of another person, 
can be said to require the use of “physical force” as an element 
and thus constitutes a “violent felony” for purposes of the fed-
eral Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)?
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Facts:
Petitioner Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of ammuni-
tion by a convicted felon. The Government sought sentencing 
under the ACCA which authorizes an enhanced penalty for a 
person who “has three previous convictions” for “a violent fel-
ony,” § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines “violent felony” as, inter 
alia, an offense that “has as an element the use . . . of physical 
force against the person of another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
One of Johnson’s prior felony convictions was a Florida 
conviction for simple battery. Under Florida law, a battery oc-
curs when a person “[a]ctually and intentionally touches” an-
other, no matter how slight.
Decision:
In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court held 
that the Florida felony offense of battery by “actually and inten-
tionally touching” another person does not have as an element 
the use of “physical force” against the person of another. Thus, 
Johnson’s conviction did not constitute a “violent felony” under 
§ 924(e)(1).
The Court considered the meaning of “physical force” in 
the statutory context of the ACCA. The Court rejected the gov-
ernment assertion that “force”, as used here, is a legal term of 
art describing one of the elements of the common-law crime 
of battery. At common law, that element was satisfied by even 
the slightest offensive touching. While Justice Scaila recog-
nized a common-law term of art should be given its established 
common-law meaning, he noted the Court does not ascribe to 
a statutory term a common-law meaning where that meaning 
“plainly do[es] not fit and produces nonsense.” Here “physical 
force” is used in defining not the crime of battery, but rather the 
statutory category of “violent felony.” In that context, the Court 
deemed “physical force” clearly means violent force—i.e., force 
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. In his 
view, because “physical force” can mean “the merest touch-
ing,” Florida’s felony battery statute falls within the scope of the 
ACCA. Justice Alito emphasized that Congress had explicitly 
limited the term “force” in other sections to the force capable 
of causing serious physical harm or bodily injury. Justice Alito 
maintained that had Congress intended to similarly limit “physi-
cal force” in the provision at issue, it could have done so.
maryLand v. shatzer
No. 08-680
Decided: February 24, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether Edwards v. Arizona, which bars police from initi-
ating a questioning after a suspect has invoked a right to coun-
sel, prohibits a police questioning initiated three years after the 
suspect invoked his right to counsel?
Facts:
In 2003, respondent Shatzer was incarcerated at a Maryland 
prison. A police detective tried to question Shatzer on a matter 
unrelated to his incarceration. Shatzer invoked his Miranda right 
to have counsel present during the interrogation, so the detec-
tive terminated the interview. Shatzer was released back into the 
general prison population and the investigation was closed. In 
2006, another detective reopened the investigation and attempted 
to interrogate Shatzer, who was still incarcerated. Shatzer waived 
his Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements.
Decision:
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held 
that because Shatzer enjoyed a break in custodial interrogation 
lasting more than two weeks, Edwards does not mandate sup-
pression of his inculpatory statements.
Edwards’ fundamental purpose is to “[p]reserv[e] the 
integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police 
only through counsel,” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 
291 (1988). The Court had previously determined that where 
a suspect was held in uninterrupted custodial interrogation, cut 
off from his normal life and isolated in a police-dominated at-
mosphere, there is a presumption that a suspect’s subsequent 
waiver was coerced. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S. 292 (1990).
In this case, however, the Court held that a fourteen-day 
break in custodial interrogation ends the Edwards presumption 
that a Miranda waiver at a subsequent interrogation is obtained 
through coercion. Where a suspect has been released from cus-
tody and “returned to his normal life for some time before the 
later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think that 
his change of heart has been coerced. He has no longer been iso-
lated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, 
family members, and friends.” The Court settled on a fourteen-
day requirement in order to give enforcement officers a clear 
and certain rule.
Justice Thomas, who concurred in part and concurred in the 
judgment, took issue with the fourteen day rule, calling it arbitrary.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He agreed the 
protections in Edwards were not eternal, but expressed concern 
that the fourteen days might pass without the suspect ever being 
provided counsel.
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padiLLa v. CommonweaLth oF kentuCky
No. 08-651
Decided: March 31, 2010
Question Presented:
Must defense counsel advise a noncitizen client regarding 
the consequences of a guilty plea upon the client’s immigration 
status?
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States for over 40 years, faced deportation after pleading 
guilty to drug-distribution charges in Kentucky. Padilla main-
tained that his counsel failed to advise him he might be deported 
as a consequence of entering a guilty plea. Padilla’s counsel, in 
fact, told him not “to worry about [deportation] since he had 
been in the country so long.” Padilla asserted that he would have 
gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice.
Decision:
In a 7-2 opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court found that 
counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of 
deportation. As a result Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally 
deficient.
The Court began by rejecting the reasoning of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee does not protect defendants from erroneous deporta-
tion advice because deportation is merely a “collateral” con-
sequence of a conviction. Justice Stevens noted the Court has 
never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences 
in defining the scope of constitutionally effective assistance.
The Court next considered whether Padilla’s counsel was 
effective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washing-
ton. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To satisfy Strickland’s two-prong test 
counsel’s representation must fall “below an objective standard 
of reasonableness,” and there must be “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Applying the Strickland 
test, Justice Stevens found clear deficiency. The consequences 
of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the 
removal statute. Padilla’s deportation was presumptively man-
datory, and his counsel’s advice was simply incorrect.
The Court, however, did recognize there will be situations 
in which the deportation consequences of a plea will be unclear. 
In those cases the Court held, “a criminal defense attorney need 
do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry adverse immigration consequences.”
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote a con-
curring opinion. Justice Alito agreed that Padilla’s attorney had 
failed to provide him effective assistance of counsel as defined 
by Strickland. However, Justice Alito disagreed with the major-
ity’s decision that a defense attorney must advise his noncitizen 
client as to the possible immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea. Justice Alito argued that, because of the complexity of 
immigration law and because criminal defense attorneys often 
lack expertise in immigration law, the Court’s “vague, halfway” 
holding that attorneys must only advise their clients on immi-
gration law that is “succinct and straightforward” would “lead 
to much confusion and needless litigation.”
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a brief dis-
sent. In it, Scalia contended the Sixth Amendment only grants a 
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel for defense 
against a criminal prosecution, and not against the “collateral 
consequences” of that prosecution.
smith v. spisak
No. 08-724
Decided: January 12, 2010
Question Presented:
Whether jury instructions may state the jury must find 
unanimously that each aggravating factor outweighs any miti-
gating circumstance?
Facts:
Ohio sentenced respondent Spisak to death. Spisak filed a 
federal habeas petition claiming that the jury instructions un-
constitutionally required the jury to consider only those miti-
gating factors on which the jury could unanimously agree were 
mitigating.
Decision:
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court uphold-
ing the jury instructions because they were not an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law–the standard of 
review for habeas petitions.
In Mills v. Maryland, the Court held that the jury instruc-
tions violated the Constitution because, read naturally, they told 
the jury that it could not find a particular circumstance to be 
mitigating unless all twelve jurors agreed that the mitigating 
circumstance had been proven to exist. 486 U. S. 367, 380–81 
(1988).
In this case, however, the Court held that, even assuming 
that Mills sets forth “clearly established Federal law,” the in-
structions met constitutional standards. While the instructions 
stated the jury had to find unanimously that each of the ag-
gravating factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances, the 
instructions did not say that the jury had to determine the ex-
istence of each individual mitigating factor unanimously. Nor 
did the instructions say anything about how the jury should 
52 Spring 2010
make individual determinations that each particular mitigating 
circumstance existed. Overall, the Court found the instructions 
focused on balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors and 
repeatedly told the jury to consider all relevant evidence.
Justice Stevens, concurring in judgment, found that the 
jury instructions violated clearly established federal law, but 
the error did not prejudice Spisak.
thaLer v. haynes
130 S. Ct. 1171
Decided: February 22, 2010
Question Presented:
Must a trial judge have personally observed the demeanor 
of a prospective juror before rejecting a demeanor-based expla-
nation for a peremptory challenge?
Facts:
Respondent Rick Thaler was convicted of murder in a 
Texas state court. During the voir dire, two judges presided 
at different stages. Judge Harper presided when the attorneys 
questioned the prospective jurors individually, but Judge Wal-
lace took over when peremptory challenges were exercised. 
When the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to attempt 
to strike a potential juror, Thaler’s attorney raised a Batson ob-
jection, that the prosecutor had dismissed the juror solely on 
the basis of race. The prosecutor responded that the peremptory 
challenged was based on the potential juror’s demeanor during 
individual questioning. Judge Wallace accepted the prosecu-
tor’s explanation and overruled the objection.
Decision:
In an unanimous decision, the Court held it is was not a 
violation of clearly established law for a judge to accept a de-
meanor-based explanation of a peremptory challenge, when the 
judge did not personally observe and recall the relevant aspect 
of the prospective juror’s demeanor.
The Court noted Batson v. Kentucky required judges ruling 
on objections to peremptory challenges to “tak[e] into account 
all possible explanatory factors in the particular case,” 476 U.S. 
79, 95 (1986). Thus, where the explanation for a peremptory 
challenge is based on a prospective juror’s demeanor, the judge 
should take into account, among other things, any observa-
tions the judge was able to make during the voir dire. But, the 
Court held, “Batson plainly did not go further and hold that a 
demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did 
not observe or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.”
wood v. aLLen
No. 08-9156
Decided: January 20, 2010
Question presented:
Whether the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act requires that all habeas petitioners show an unreasonable 
determination of facts by clear and convincing evidence?
Facts:
Holly Wood was convicted and sentenced to death in Ala-
bama. Wood petitioned the state for post-conviction relief, ar-
guing that his trial counsel were ineffective under Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), because they failed to 
investigate and present evidence of his mental deficiencies dur-
ing the penalty phase of trial. The state court rejected Wood’s 
argument. In so doing, the court made a factual finding that 
counsel had made a strategic decision not to pursue evidence of 
Wood’s alleged retardation.
Wood subsequently sought federal habeas relief under the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254. Section 2254 has two subsections that govern challenges 
to state factual findings. Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court 
may grant relief if the state court decision was “based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the State court proceeding”. Under § 2254(e)(1), 
“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court [is] 
presumed to be correct,” unless the petitioner rebuts “the pre-
sumption . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”
Decision:
The Court originally granted certiorari to address the re-
lationship between §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). The issue was 
whether subsection (e)(1) modifies all challenges brought under 
subsection (d)(2), such that every habeas petitioner must show 
an unreasonable determination of facts by clear and convincing 
evidence.
However, in the 7-2 decision, written by Justice Soto-
mayor, the Court did not address the issue. Rather, the Court 
found that, under either interpretation, the state court’s factual 
determination was not “unreasonable.” As such the Court did 
not reach the question of whether § 2254(e)(1) applies in every 
case presenting a challenge under § 2254(d)(2).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Stevens argued that, while Wood’s lawyers 
had decided not to further investigate or present evidence of 
his mental impairments, this decision was not a “strategic” one. 
Rather, “the failure to investigate was the product of inattention 
and neglect by attorneys preoccupied with other concerns and 
not the product of a deliberate choice between two permissible 
alternatives.”
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grAnted certiorAri:
aBBott v. united states; 
gouLd v. united states
Docket Number: 09-479 and 09-7073
Question Presented:
What is the proper interpretation and application of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(I)(A)’s “except” clause for mandatory mini-
mum sentences involving drug and gun crimes?
Facts:
Gould was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C § 922(g). Abbott was also sentenced to 10 years for con-
spiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more 
of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. In addition, both 
men were sentenced to an additional 5 years for possession of 
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In both cases, the judges ordered 
these five years to run consecutively.
Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides for a five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug-trafficking crime “except to the extent that a greater mini-
mum sentence is otherwise provided by . . . any other provi-
sion of law.” Both men now maintain that, because they were 
sentenced to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence by “other 
provisions of law,” the 5-year mandatory minimum for possess-





Whether Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), 
which established that the erroneous admission of a coerced 
confession at the trial is not harmless, is “clearly established 
federal law” for the purposes of a federal habeas corpus case 
where the defendant pleaded guilty or no contest?
Facts:
Randy Moore was suspected of murder. The police obtained 
Moore’s taped confession through unconstitutional means be-
cause, although Moore requested the assistance of counsel, the 
interrogating officers ignored the request and continued ques-
tioning. However, Moore’s attorney failed to recognize that the 
confession to the police was inadmissible and never filed a mo-





May a municipality be held liable for a single Brady viola-
tion when it failed to properly train a local prosecutor?
Facts:
In May, 1985, John Thompson was tried, convicted, and 
sentenced to death for murder. During the trial, Thompson 
did not take the stand on his own behalf because of a previous 
armed robbery conviction. Thompson spent eighteen years in 
prison, fourteen of which were spent on death row, and was 
nearly executed by the State. He was exonerated after it was 
discovered that an assistant district attorney had destroyed ex-
culpatory evidence to obtain the armed robbery conviction.
In 2003, Thompson sued district attorney’s office. The jury 
found that district attorney’s office was “deliberately indiffer-
ent” to the need to train, monitor, and supervise his prosecutors 
to comply with the constitutional requirements concerning pro-





Whether the right to the effective assistance of counsel re-
quires defense counsel to produce expert-opinion testimony?
Facts:
Respondent Joshua Richter was accused of murder. The 
incident involved multiple gunshots from a variety of weapons 
and two markedly different stories of events. The prosecution 
called two expert witnesses to explain the forensic evidence at 
the scene. However, defense counsel never called his own ex-






Whether statements made by a wounded citizen concern-
ing circumstances of his shooting are non-testimonial because 
they were made under circumstances indicating that the primary 
purpose of the questioning was to assist police in an ongoing 
emergency?
Facts:
On April 29, 2001 at approximately 3:25 a.m., police of-
ficers responded to a radio dispatch indicating that a man had 
been shot. Police found the victim lying on the ground next to 
his car. The victim had a gunshot wound in his abdomen and 
appeared to be in considerable pain. In response to the officers’ 
questioning, the victim indicated that he had been shot at ap-
proximately 3:00 a.m. while standing outside of the defendant’s 
back door. The victim stated that before being shot he had a 
short conversation through a closed door with defendant. He 
identified defendant as the shooter because, although he did not 
see the defendant, the victim knew recognized the defendant’s 
voice. The victim died within a few hours after he was trans-
ported to the hospital. During the trial, the court admitted the 




May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment 
after a full trial on the merits if the party did not appeal the order 
before trial?
Facts:
Michelle Ortiz is a former inmate. She was sexually as-
saulted by a prison guard on two successive nights and prison 
officials failed to protect her from the second assault. Ortiz sued 
several of the prison officials. The district court denied the de-
fendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified im-
munity. The defendants did not file an interlocutory appeal of 
the denial of qualified immunity. CLB
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